General MacArthur's report, concerning exemption of the Emperor from War Criminals, January 25, 1946
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET TOT
PRIORITY
From: CINCAFPAC [Commander in Chief, American Forces, Pacific] Adv Tokyo, Japan
To: War Department
Nr: CA 57235
25 January 1946 [*1]
From CINCAFPAC Adv MacArthur to WARCOS [War Department, Chief of Staff] Joint Chiefs of Staff reference WX 93871 CA 57235.
Since receipt of WX 85811 [*2] investigation has been conducted here under the limitations set forth with reference to possible criminal actions against the emperor. No specific and tangible evidence has been uncovered with regard to his exact activities which might connect him in varying degree with the political decisions of the Japanese Empire during the last decade. I have gained the definite impression from as complete a research as was possible to me that his connection with affairs of state up to the time of the end of the war was largely ministerial and automatically responsive to the advice of his counsellors. There are those who believe that even had he positive ideas it would have been quite possible that any effort on his part to thwart the current of public opinion controlled and represented by the dominant military clique would have placed him in actual jeopardy.
If he is to be tried great changes must be made in occupational plans and due preparation therefore should be accomplished in preparedness before actual action is initiated. His indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be over estimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate. Practically all Japanese venerate him as the social need of the state and believe rightly or wrongly that the Potsdam Agreements were intended to maintain him as the Emperor of Japan. They will regard allied action [to the contrary as the greatest *3] ***** betrayal in their history and the hatreds and resentments engendered by this thought will unquestionably last for all measurable time. A Vendetta for revenge will thereby be initiated whose cycle may well not be complete for centuries if ever.
The whole of Japan can be expected, in my opinion, to resist the action either by passive or semi-active means. They are disarmed and therefore represent no special means co trained and equipped troops; but is [it] is not inconceivable that all government agencies will break down, the civilized practices will largely cease, and a condition of underground chaos and disorder amounting to guerilla warfare in the mountainous and outlying regions result, I believe all hope of introducing modern democratic methods would disappear and that when military control finally ceased some form of intense regimentation probably along communistic line would arise from the mutilated masses. This would represent an entirely different problem of occupation from those now prevalent. It would be absolutely essential to greatly increase the occupational forces. It is quite possible that a minimum of a million troops would be required which would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of years. In addition a complete civil service might have to be recruited and imported, possibly running into a size of several hundred thousand. An overseas supply service under such conditions would have to be set up on practically a war basis embracing an indigent civil population of many millions. Many other most drastic results which I will not attempt to discuss should be anticipated and complete new plans should be carefully prepared by the Allied powers along all lines to meet the new eventualities. Most careful consideration as to the national forces composing the occupation force is essential. Certainly the US should not be called upon to bear unilaterally the terrific burden of man power, economics, and other resultant responsibilities.
The decision as to whether the emperor should be tried as a war criminal involves a policy determination upon such a high level that I would not feel it appropriate for me to make a recommendation; but if the decision by the heads of states is in the affirmative, I recorded the above measures as imperative.
End
ACTION: JC/S
INFO : Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Vandenberg, Adm Nimitz, C of S
CM-IN 5885 (26 JAN 46) DTG 251645Z VD
November 23, 2021
*1: (National Diet Library, Japan)
*2:
*3:Words in brackets supplied by Department of Defense.
(Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State)history.state.gov
